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Abstracts 
Concerned with the contradicting approaches to ethics and economics in business management, the 
author examines the decision-making patterns of workers and managers of a construction firm.  The 
drive behind the workers (and managers) falls roughly into three categories of incentives.  The 
incentives coincide with the three tendencies in man which define the Plato-Aristotelian psychograph.  
When the tendencies are in accord with the Aristotelian bonum rationis (good of practical 
reasonableness), there is synergy in the incentives.  The alignment of incentives calls for fundamental 
behavioral postulates which should underpin ethico-economic systems. 
Keywords: incentives, virtue, economics, profit, ethics, goals, end, factors, synergy, alignment of 
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Introduction 
A bright student who has been attending lectures both in the Faculty of Commerce and the 
School of Humanities and Social Sciences of a renowned university once confronted his philosophy 
lecturer with a startling query.  “Sir”, said the whiz kid, “in the business school they tell us that the 
profit motive is the supreme law of success in any business enterprise: managers of joint-stock 
companies are supposed to maximise shareholder value.  But in the School of Humanities, they deny 
this... Why don’t you guys make up your mind?”  Indeed many a person —not only the economist— 
is likely to view with raised eyebrows the following assertion by a well-known Chicago economist: 
‘A person is reliable if and only if it is more advantageous to him than being unreliable (...) someone 
is honest only if honesty, or the appearance of honesty, pays more than dishonesty.’i  Virtue is fully 
placed at the service of owner value maximization.. 
 
Yet a score of economists with qualms on the sheer exploits of so-called ‘turbo capitalism’ 
have tried to save the situation by postulating the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility which, I 
feel, is like throwing a bit of holy water at an unhappy business venture in order to appease ones 
conscience.  In 1970 Milton Friedman published a short but extremely controversial essay in which he 
denied that corporate executives had any moral duty to relax the conditions of profit maximization on 
behalf of the wider interests of society.ii  They are under a strict contractual duty to act for the owners 
of the company (the stockholders). For executives (or, indeed, owners) to use company resources to 
advance social goals (such as affirmative action in the workplace, social justice remuneration, and 
rigorous environmental constraints that exceed the requirements of positive law) would be for them to 
usurp the political function.  Needless to say, the student was right...academia is hobbling, now on one 
foot, now on the other...resulting in confusion in the minds of many students. 
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Following on the principle of the unity of truth, economics and ethics —fields of studies both 
purporting to speak for man— should have a unified approach.  But then the big question arises: how 
on earth is this to be achieved?  This paper is an attempt at laying out a template for an integrated 
approach to ethics and economics. 
The Case of Quest Works Company Limited 
 
Quest Works is a general building contractor.  Unlike well established companies in building 
construction and general civil engineering works, Quest Works is a relatively late entry —established 
in 2008 and made up of very young engineers and quantity surveyors.  It therefore came as a surprise 
that they won the bid to build Strathmore Phase III and still a greater surprise that they did it in record 
time and for a whopping KSh 300 million (U$3.5 million) less. A decision was made to carry out a 
qualitative survey of the company and the objective was to find out what drives the employees to 
attain such great feats and with little supervision.  The interviews were conducted on the 27th and 
28th of January 2012 
 
We set out to gather an in-depth understanding of the fundamental behavioural postulates and 
reasons that govern such an achievement. We set out to investigate the why and the how of the 
decision-making patterns of these workers, not just the what, where and when. We worked on a small 
but focused sample of about 30 employees. Interview transcripts were categorised to facilitate 
analysis.  By summarizing the prevalence of codes, discussing similarities and differences in related 
codes from distinct original contexts, or comparing the relationship between one or more codes, we 
came to a near perfect confirmation of our hypothesis. 
Light and Fire 
 
Man is not characterised in terms of rationality for nothing.  He thinks all the time.  He tries 
to figure out how to optimise his welfare.  Contrary to popular belief that the majority of mankind can 
pass a whole lifetime without ever eliciting a single thought, man evokes reason to help him rank his 
preferences according to the satisfaction they afford him.  He decides, for example, because he is 
asthmatic, to change from a well-paying job as a factory manager in a large flour firm to being a taxi 
operator because of the implied health hazards; or perhaps he decides to take public means of 
transport to his work place rather than his car because he wants to save for a mortgage he has taken 
out; or again he postpones a holiday abroad in preference to a local one to be able to afford fees for a 
child who has been accepted to a good but expensive school, etc. 
 
By comparing and grouping the codes, we found out that the drive behind the Dream Team 
—that is how we came to call Quest Works— falls roughly into three categories of incentives:  
• The workers seemed to be motivated to work on account of internal reasons like the 
enjoyment this work gave them; they thought they were engaged in something important; 
or they simply felt that what they were learning in the process was significant in their 
career development. 
• Yet they also felt compelled to work fast because of factors external to them like having 
very understanding bosses, bonus over Christmas and job security. 
• But there was something else which they could not quite lay their hands on.  Some 
described it as ‘good working conditions’ and others as ‘respect of staff’ or simply ‘the 
Strathmore spirit’.  This is what is referred to later as transcendental incentives... 
 
In effect, human preferences can largely be grouped into three main domains: a desire for a 
sense of fair play (the realm of iura — relating to rights and entitlements and regulated by the virtue 
of justice); desire for pleasurable goods (concupiscibilia — these are the goods that provoke pleasant 
sensations and are regulated by temperance, moderation or self-control) and the excitement derived 
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from the pursuit of the so-called arduous goods (irascibilia — the realm of power incentives regulated 
by courage).iii  The human being tries to figure out the preferences to settle for by means of what is 
known as practical syllogism, a form of deductive reasoning whose structure comprises a major 
premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion; for example, All humans are mortal, the major premise; I 
am a human, the minor premise; therefore, I am mortal, the conclusion...  One does not actually need 
to formally frame the argument to himself; he can do all this mentally and almost unawares... 
 
Now in a practical syllogism, as opposed to a theoretical one (as in the above case), the goal 
(or rather, the desire for it —motivation) is the major premise, while the means employed to obtain 
the goal —again, the desire for them because they are judged as choice worthy by prudence— 
represent the minor premise.  What then in this framework would correspond to the ‘conclusion’?  
Action, of course...  It follows immediately on the choice of a set of means to employ.  Two things are 
therefore at work in every human endeavour: motivation and reason, incentive and intelligence.  All 
of us need something, such as the fear of punishment or the expectation of reward, to induce us to 
action or motivate us to effort —the proverbial ‘carrot and stick’ method is not just mere talk.  Yet we 
also apply ourselves with some level of acumen or even shrewdness —that is to say, not blindly— to 
whatever venture we consider worthy of pursuit.  In order to be moved to action, man stands in need 
of fire in his heart and light in the mind... But let us take a closer look at the first of the pair… 
Motivation 
 
All human beings have need of incentives, a factor that motivates a person to achieve a 
particular goal.  Incentives are like the driving force behind our actions.  People need positive 
incentives to encourage them to exercise regularly and to eat healthily. Incentives are especially 
important for competitive sports.  People who have to train intensively and strictly regulate their diets 
to achieve success.  Incentives vary from individual to individual, but they fall largely within the three 
preferential domains discussed above: 
(1) Intrinsic incentivesiv: this matches the realm of sensory incentives (concupiscibilia) —
values are grasped in the immediate and give rise to pleasant sensations, that is to say, a 
person does something for the enjoyment it affords him.  The enjoyment does not have to 
be physical.  This is the case, for example, of open-source nerds who dedicate lots of time 
and effort to developing systems which they then upload free of charge to the internet.  In 
the Dream Team case they cited environment of freedom and respect and developing 
skills and abilities. 
(2) Extrinsic incentives: here values are grasped with some sense of externality —with some 
interval of space and time— and originate such reactions as aggression or impulsiveness 
because one has to overcome obstacles to obtain them.  An example is a person who will 
go to great lengths to help you repair a flat tyre because he knows you can employ him 
and thus solve his financial woes —here money is the extrinsic incentive.  In the case 
above they coded this as ‘good pay’, ‘bonus over Christmas’ and ‘provision of clean 
drinking water’.  Both a) and b) are, by and large, within the realm of individual good.  
However, in the next group of incentives a different logic is at work. 
(3) Transcendental incentives: this is the classical case of doing things for God, family and 
patria.  Here the principle of ‘the good of the other’ reigns supreme as a response to 
aspirations deriving from the social nature of the individual and incorporating the concern 
for third parties.v  One transcends, goes beyond and, so to speak, rises above his own 
good and pursues that of the others.  One rejoices with the good of others —his main 
incentive— and becomes sad with their misfortune.  A strong sense of achievement is 
driven by what he sees as the good of his family, country or ‘rights’ of God.  This is what 
the Dream Team employees perceived in the so-called ‘Strathmore spirit’.  They realized 
that the general environment was permeated by this ‘otherness’...from administrative staff 
to lecturers; from menial workers to professors... 
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How does one know which one of the motives is operational or dominant at any given time?  
Well, by asking or by carrying out what one would call an inter-motivational check.  For example, a 
Sales Manager is asked by his boss to earn extra money by going off to a promotional rally on a 
Sunday afternoon but declines the offer and instead takes his family out for a cricket match.  Here 
incentive types c) and a) override type b).  We will be able to appreciate later on how this perspective 
is the basis for a “virtue system” for lack of the right terminology.vi 
 
But one could argue that motivation —see types a) and b)— is much too self-interested a 
claim to be used as a paradigmatic benchmark for a value system.  Yet well understood, self-interest 
can very well serve the social purpose. Indeed, as seen in the case above, in order to reach long-term 
goals, a sense of achievement must be reinforced continually by successful completion of short-term 
intermediate (self-interested) goals. 
Love for Oneself and the Common Good 
 
Adam Smith may have been right after all… at least to some degree: the ‘selfish’ pursuit of 
one’s own good could serve a social purpose. And this is putting it mildly.  The material standard of 
living people in the West enjoy today is due to little else but the ‘selfish’ pursuit of profit.  It is a point 
that Adam Smith emphasized in The Wealth of Nations: “It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest.”  Far from being the fatal defect of capitalism, it would seem to be the very reason capitalism 
works.vii 
 
In effect to many, the term selfish has the meaning of ‘self-centred’, ‘self-seeking’, ‘self-
interested’ or ‘egocentric’ as opposed to altruistic. Yet well understood self-interest could have the 
meaning of ‘pursuit for one’s own true good’. As long as this good is a true good of the individual 
then, far from working against the social purpose (common good), it enhances it.  Adam Smith’s only 
‘error’ was to have a partial and reductionist conception of the individual good — conceiving it only 
in materialist terms, that is to say, he was concerned mainly with the individual being better off as 
opposed to being better. This approach, involves a two-fold reductio with regard to the understanding 
of the true individual good: first from true self-interest to inordinate self-interest (greed) and then 
from inordinate self-interest to material self-interest.  Needless to say, this approach impoverishes 
economic analysis, e.g. characterising development only in terms of GDP per capita.viii 
 
There is a world of a difference between greed (a vice) and true self-interest.  In a scenario of 
true individual and common goods what is optimal for the consumer is optimal also for the 
community of persons to which he belongs (the family, the firm, the state). This is because the firm or 
the state is a social organization in which individuals demonstrate a willingness to join forces in the 
pursuit of a common goal that does not negate the private goals of the individuals themselves, which 
is why they join the organization in the first place (Fontrodona 2003).ix The individual’s goals are 
inextricably bound up among themselves and with the common goal that unites the organization, etc.x 
 
Manifestly, whatever fosters individualism is evil, works against nature and leads to skewed 
incentives.  Greed and covetousness, the desire to have more than our due share of the things of the 
earth, develop the evil traits of that selfishness which is the radical defect in fallen nature.  He, who 
yields to selfishness and greed sets himself apart from his neighbour, enters into rivalry with those 
whose interests compete with his own, hardens into an unfeeling individualist and thus becomes a 
disruptive element in the social life of mankind —disruptive because of the misalignment of 
incentives (witness the recent financial crash). 
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Virtue and Reason 
 
Now virtue is the main motivational agent.xi  This is because it fixes the incentives —the 
desires within the three great domains seen above— in the will, creating, so to speak, a second nature 
in us.  This makes one derive some delight in pursuing virtuous goals, much in the same way as an 
accomplished musician —having ‘fixed’ the principles of music in his mind— enjoys playing a 
musical instrument… and can do it even when unawares.  As they are built into the psyche 
(will/reason), the desire for goals —the incentives— then act as the major premise of practical 
discourse and hence facilitate a correct decision-making process.  When we say reason, we mean 
practical reason and reason in its perfection of prudence, the chariot driver of all virtue.  The good 
‘motives’ —incentives— fixed by virtue in the will rectify prudential discourse by providing it with 
the correct compass reading, the correct premise which is a pre-requisite for a good conclusion (action 
in the moral order).  Prudence then proceeds to determine the golden mean for virtue to choose —the 
right set of means for a given pursuit.  The two (moral virtue and prudence) are then, as it were, in a 
symbiotic relationship: [moral] virtue —the rational desire for the correct mix of concupiscible, 
irascible and the just good —rectifies [prudential] decision while prudence facilitates [virtuous] 
choice by indicating the golden mean. This is what makes for the correct alignment of incentives in 
the activities of reasonable individuals —a Pareto optimality of sorts.  It provides for synergy in our 
desires and hence a unique focus of approach to issues. 
 
It is important to emphasize that incentives are, so to speak, fixed in the psyche by acquiring 
virtues.  Although concerned with choice, virtue produces its effect in the realm of goals while 
economic factors are just that, ‘factors’ in this whole scheme of things.  “The ultimate ends of the 
activities of reasonable beings are never economic.  Strictly speaking, there is no ‘economic motive’ 
but only economic factors conditioning our striving for other ends.  What in ordinary language is 
misleadingly called the ‘economic motive’ means merely the desire for general opportunity, the desire 
for power to achieve unspecified ends.  If we strive for money it is because it offers us the widest 
choice in enjoying the fruits of our efforts”.xii 
 
Every individual has to work at his own ‘virtue system’ because the incentives which are at 
the root of the major premise of a practical discourse cannot be transmitted from individual to 
individual.  Each individual has to work them personally into his psyche. Centrally planned 
economies therefore make very little sense.  There is not a single moment when a state or government 
can claim to know what is optimal for any of its citizens.  The role of the state is to provide an 
enabling environment and act as arbiter.  As for the Human Resource departments of firms, one hopes 
that their main focus is to scout for individual attitude, that is to say, a virtue system —albeit a 
budding one and hence only a potential of virtue—which ensures a correct alignment of incentives, 
and then train for skills.  This was the happy experience of Quest Works management.  They literally 
went out and ‘poached’, not the most skilful workers, but those who had ‘good attitudes’.  On seeing 
the pace and intensity of work at the site a consultant who was used to seeing ‘slave drivers’ 
wondered aloud: “where are the supervisors?” One really hopes that more surveys can be conducted 
in this area in the near future. 
Conclusion 
 
This essay has highlighted the central idea that, in the final analysis, market outcomes, socio-political 
issues and government actions should be judged in terms of valuable human ends (the motivational 
aspect).  Now, in practical life the ends (not the ends in themselves, but the desire for the end —the 
incentives) are the major premise, the principles or point of departure upon which all the conclusions 
depend — or, if you wish, the fundamental behavioural postulates on which a value system rests.xiii  
An error in the premise leads to wrong conclusions. Wrong incentives lead to asymmetrical value 
systems.  Stephen Hawking may have had this in mind when he said, ‘No matter how powerful a 
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computer you have, if you put lousy data in, you will get lousy predictions out.’xiv Now, virtue — in 
its intentional aspect — consolidates the right set of incentives thus grounding the premises of 
prudential syllogism. The absence of these true fundamental postulates would jeopardise the very 
quest for a balanced value system and disrupt the harmonious operations of a family, a firm or a state. 
 
There is, therefore, a need to consolidate the premises from which our value system takes its 
departure. This can only be done from a deeper understanding of the human person. We propose to 
summarise the behavioural postulates into four fundamental principles, namely:xv 
• The principle of individual liberty (and its attendant responsibility)xvi that translates into 
creating space for individual agency in the economy, in the social realm and in politics. Policy 
makers should allow for some slack in the social, business and political environment e.g. 
liberalised regimes, looser monetary and fiscal policies, more flexible labour laws, flexible 
educational policies, a level playing-ground, etc.  Other than this, states should avoid the 
temptation of trying to ‘plan progress’ for their citizens.  “The guiding principle, that a policy 
of freedom for the individual is the only truly progressive policy, remains as true today as it 
was in the nineteenth century.”xvii  Fill the world with good people and then set them free... 
• The principle of optimality (or alignment of the incentives) ‘operationalised’ in the choice of 
the right mix of pleasurable and arduous goods. (Remember that what is optimal in whichever 
domain of consumer behaviour facilitates optimality both in the other domains and for the 
person.)xviii A choice of too much (or too little) of a commodity may lead to hazardous 
consequences, as in the case of remunerating CEOs (chief executives) through stock derivatives 
like options.xix This may lead to their overstating the firm’s financial position. Similarly, an 
executive who is averse to taking risks may not do well for his firm, just as the one who takes 
too much risk may lead his firm into serious jeopardy (witness Barings Bank).xx 
• The principle of justice by means of which rights and entitlements are guaranteed. A person’s 
entitlement set is a way of characterising his or her overall command over things —thus 
ensuring an incentive-based agency— taking note of all relevant rights and obligations. 
Whereas rights are generally characterised as relationships that hold between distinct agents 
(e.g. between one person and another person, or between a person and a state), a person’s 
entitlements are the totality of things he can have by virtue of his rights. Privations tend to arise 
from people not being entitled in the prevailing legal system of institutional rights, say, to food, 
water or education —without entitlement, there is no incentive to work. 
• The principle of rationality (read prudence): this ensures that decisions are optimal not only 
according to self-interested pursuit of the material well-being but according to the total well-
being of the human person (relating to his or her personal physical and mental well-being) and 
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temporary overvaluation of equities, encouraging short-sighted managerial decisions and storing 
up problems for the companies in the future (cf. The Economist, 7 August 1999, p. 11). 
xx The Nick Leeson and Barings Bank case is a classic example. The imprudence of a 28-year-old 
trader on the Singapore Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) and the greed and stupidity of a 233-year-
old bank combined to destroy an investment empire and in the process stunned the world. (Leeson 
had been appointed manager of a new operation in futures markets on the SIMEX and was soon 
making millions for Barings by betting on the future direction of the Nikkei Index. In his 
autobiography, Rogue Trader, Leeson said the ethos at Barings was simple: ‘We were all driven to 
make profits, profits, and more profits . . . . I was the rising star.’ Cf. 
     http://www.bbc.co.uk/crime/caseclosed/nickleeson.shtml [accessed 4 May 2000].) 
